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FALLING KIDNAPPING RATES AND THE EXPANSION OF MOBILE 







This paper tries to explain why kidnapping has fallen so dramatically in Colombia 
during the period 2000-2008. The widely held belief is that the falling kidnapping rates 
can basically be explained as a consequence of the success of President Alvaro 
Uribe´s democratic security policy. Without providing conclusive alternative 
explanations, some academic papers have expressed doubts about Uribe’s security 
policy being the main cause of this phenomenon. While we consider the democratic 
security policy as constituting a necessary condition behind Colombia’s falling 
kidnapping rates, we argue in this paper that a complementary condition underlying this 
phenomenon has been the significant increase during this period in the speed and 
quality of communications between potential victims and public security forces. In this 
sense, the expansion of the mobile phone industry in Colombia implies that there has 
been a substantial reduction in information asymmetries between kidnappers and 
targeted citizens. This has led to a higher level of deterrence as well as to higher costs 
for perpetrating this type of crime. This has resulted in a virtuous circle: improved 
security allows higher investments in telecommunications around the country, which in 
turn lead to faster communications between citizens and security forces, which 
consequently leads to greater security. We introduce a Becker-Ehrlich type supply and 
demand model for kidnappings. Using regional and departmental data on kidnapping, 
the police and mobile phones, we show that mobile phone network expansion has 
expanded the effective coverage of public protection; this, in turn, has led to a 
spectacular reduction in kidnapping rates.  
JEL Classification: N46, O39. 
Key words: Kidnapping, mobile phones, Colombia. 
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DISMINUCIÓN DEL SECUESTRO Y EXPANSIÓN DE LA 
TELEFONÍA MÓVIL EN COLOMBIA 
Santiago Montenegro 
 Álvaro Pedraza 
Resumen 
En este artículo presentamos una explicación de las causas de la dramática 
reducción del secuestro en Colombia entre 2000 y 2008. La creencia generalizada 
es que la disminución en las tasas de secuestro se explica fundamentalmente como 
consecuencia del éxito de la Política de Seguridad Democrática del Presidente 
Álvaro Uribe. Sin dar explicaciones alternativas concluyentes, algunos trabajos 
académicos han expresado dudas sobre esta hipótesis. En tanto nosotros 
consideramos que la Seguridad Democrática fue una razón necesaria para la 
disminución del secuestro, en este trabajo planteamos que la expansión y la mejor 
calidad de las comunicaciones entre las víctimas potenciales y la fuerza pública fue 
una condición complementaria a la política de seguridad para la disminución del 
secuestro. En este sentido, la expansión de la telefonía móvil en Colombia ha 
implicado una reducción en las asimetrías de información entre los secuestradores 
y las víctimas potenciales. Esto generó un efecto disuasivo y aumentó los costos de 
perpetrar este tipo de crimen. Así se dio un círculo virtuoso: las mejorías en la 
seguridad permitieron mayores inversiones en telecomunicaciones en todo el país, 
lo que a su vez implicó una mayor comunicación con la fuerza pública, y en 
consecuencia una mejora en seguridad. Para sustentar nuestra hipótesis 
introducimos un modelo teórico de oferta y demanda de secuestros del tipo Becker-
Ehrlich. Usando información departamental y regional de secuestros, policía y 
celulares, mostramos que la expansión de la red de telefonía móvil incrementó la 
cobertura efectiva de la fuerza pública, lo que a su vez, condujo a una espectacular 
reducción de las tasas de secuestros.  
 
Clasificación JEL: N46, O39. 










This paper tries to explain the causes of the dramatic fall in kidnapping rates 
in Colombia in recent years.  It is widely assumed that this marked downtrend in 
kidnappings is a consequence of the Colombian government´s successful security 
policy, initiated by the administration of President Alvaro Uribe.  There is no doubt 
that without the measures introduced against terrorist organizations, Colombia´s 
violence rate in general, and with respect to kidnapping in particular, would be 
significantly higher than today´s level.  However, in some academic circles (Rubio 
2004), there has been a preoccupation with whether the government´s overall 
security policies have been a sufficient condition underlying the steep decline 
observed in kidnapping rates.  We argue that, while the democratic security policy 
has been a necessary condition, a complementary condition is required to explain 
the success of Colombia in reducing violence, both in general, and with respect to 
kidnapping in particular.    
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a brief overview of 
the Colombian cycle of violence that began in the 80’s, peaked during the 90’s, and 
more recently, has lessened. In section 3, we focus on the manner in which 
kidnapping rates have evolved, review the relevant existent literature, and present 
an alternative explanatory hypothesis for the fall in kidnapping rates. In section 4, 
we introduce a Becker-Ehrlich supply and demand model for kidnappings. In 
section 5, we present our data and carry out an econometric estimation of the 
model. Section 6 concludes.   
2.  Colombia´s last cycle of violence 
Since the 1980’s, the homicide and kidnapping rates have followed similar 
trends. Both exploded during the second half of the eighties, peaked during the 
nineties, and more recently have fallen (though historically speaking, the current 
rates are still significantly high). As indicated in Figure 1, during the early eighties, 




continuously increased over the course of the eighties, and peaked at 80 per one 
hundred thousand inhabitants in 1990. From 1990 onward, the homicide rate fell, 
until 1998, at which point it again began to increase, through 2002, the year the 
Uribe administration took over the government. Since that year, it has continuously 
fallen, reaching a level of 33 per one hundred inhabitants in 2008. Should these 
trends continue in the future, Colombia could return to pre-crisis levels of violence, 
which, although low relative to the peak years, were still very high when compared 
to international standards, as Figure 2 indicates. 
Figure 1. The evolution of the kidnapping and homicide rates in Colombia, from 
1962 to 2008. 
Source: National Police, Dane, authors calculations.
 
Figure 2. Homicides per 100.000 residents in Latin America for the years 1997 
and 2007 
 




What caused this explosion in violence and the following cycle is subject to debate 
in Colombia as well as in international academic circles. A necessary but perhaps 
insufficient condition underlying the crisis’ emergence during the eighties was the 
consolidation in Colombia of the illegal drug industry. First, there was the marijuana 
boom that began in the 1970s, and which lasted for about a decade, until domestic 
production in the United States began to substitute for Colombian exports. A more 
lethal and destructive boom began soon after that, namely that related to cocaine 
production and drug trafficking to U.S. and European markets. This boom was led 
by the powerful drug cartels of the cities of Medellin and Cali; these either killed, 
menaced or intimidated government officials, judges, and members of the police 
and armed forces. During the 1989-90 presidential campaign, three presidential 
candidates were assassinated, among them Luis Carlos Galán, who was then well 
ahead in the opinion polls.   
Following some lag time, the Colombian state reacted to this criminal 
offensive; within a few years, and with the support of the United States and other 
governments, the Medellin and Cali drug cartels had been destroyed and their 
leaders killed, imprisoned or extradited to the United States. Unfortunately, the 
cartels were soon replaced by even more dangerous actors—namely, the Marxist 
guerrilla groups that have existed since the 1960s, along with certain right-wing 
paramilitary organizations.   
From a certain theoretical perspective, initially the guerrilla groups were able 
to justify their existence and their struggle to achieve certain political goals; as 
soon as they began to finance their activities using drug money, however, they 
became less political and more criminally oriented. A failed peace process towards 
the end of the 1990’s—whereby the government handed a Swiss-size demilitarized 
area to the FARC guerrilla group —ended up confirming the worst expectations.   
Peace was not achieved, and the rates of violence again increased to the extent 
that some analysts, among them, those representative of the Council on Foreign 




paramilitary groups soon spread around the country, generating even more 
violence, anarchy and human rights violations. 
Tired with and scared by the government’s generous approach towards 
guerrilla groups, the next presidential campaign saw Colombians overwhelmingly 
support Alvaro Uribe, who ran on a platform promising a tougher approach in 
dealing with terrorism and anarchy. As soon as Uribe took office, his government 
began to implement his “democratic security policy,” which quickly showed 
impressive results. Upon taking over the reins of govenrment, the new 
administration found that close to 160 municipalities had no police; that illegal 
armed groups controlled nearly 40% of Colombia’s territory; that between 1998 and 
2002, Colombia’s per capita GDP had not grown; that unemployment had jumped 
to 20% of the labor force; and that investment had collapsed to 12% of GDP.  The 
homicide rate stood above 60 per one hundred thousand inhabitants, a figure 
which, while below its early-90’s peak, was still nonetheless very high. Indeed, 
most Colombians found it impossible to travel in the countryside.  Perhaps worst of 
all was that a significant share of Colombia’s educated elite was beginning to give 
up on the future of the country. Young professionals were migrating abroad by the 
thousands, and many began to believe that Colombia would never be viable as a 
normal, liberal, democratic state. More than simply being pessimistic, they were 
fatalistic about the future.   
As a result of the policies introduced by the new administration, however, 
together with the restructuring of the armed forces carried out by the administration 
of the previous president, Andres Pastrana, and the measures and activities 
introduced under the umbrella of the U.S.-sponsored Plan Colombia, this bleak 
picture began to change. Between 2002 and 2007, the number of individuals in the 
armed forces increased by 32%, jumping from 307.000 to 405.000 members. 
Moreover, before too long, all of the municipalities had a police presence. Most 
paramilitary groups demobilized under the umbrella of a new law approved by 




to neighboring countries.  By 2007, the homicide rate had fallen to its lowest level 
in twenty years and the rate of kidnappings reached levels not seen since the early 
eighties.  Consistent with these trends, the economy began to recover, with the 
overall investment rate peaking at 26% of GDP during 2006-2007; growth resumed 
high rates and unemployment fell. Most importantly, Colombians began to regain 
confidence in their country.  
3.  The evolution of kidnapping 
As mentioned above, the evolution of kidnapping in Colombia followed the 
overall cycle of violence that Colombia experienced during the eighties. According 
to Mauricio Rubio (2004), one of the most well versed academics on Colombian 
violence, kidnapping in this country is  linked to politically-motivated (guerilla) 
groups, groups which have existed since the 1960s. Through indoctrination and 
highly centralized decision processes, these political groups have been able to 
deal with agency problems common to such organizations.  Ideological training 
diffuses personal responsibility, while also reducing individual tendencies to 
appropriate large cash ransoms. Political motivations also help assimilate 
kidnapping with the taxing of wealthy Colombians and aliens.  According to Rubio, 
this may explain why non-political groups, unlike guerrilla groups, have not been 
able to engage in kidnapping in a systematic way.  This might also explain why it 
has been so difficult for authorities to combat such a powerful, illegal industry.   
Over the course of the twenty-year cycle of violence, it is possible to observe 
two structural upward shocks with respect to kidnapping rates, both of which are 
followed by acute declines.  According to Rubio, these cycles have nothing to do 
with social or economic variables. The first upsurge began during the early months 
of 1987, and ended around 1991.  Rubio argues that it is not clear as to what 
caused the end of this boom.  According to him, against several possible causes, 
the only explanatory variable that stands up to all statistical tests is the change in 
the criminal procedure implemented at the beginning of 1987 (Law 50), a change 




kidnapping rates fell to a floor significantly higher than the pre-boom level.  While 
the annual kidnapping rate per hundred thousand inhabitants had been below 1 up 
through 1986, between 1992 and 1997, the kidnapping rate stood at between 3 
and 4 per one hundred thousand inhabitants.  Rubio does not elaborate as to the 
reasons for this higher floor.   
Starting at this higher level, the second boom began at the end of 1997, and, 
according to Rubio, had no relationship with any economic or social aggregate 
variable.  Likewise,  no  relationship can be established between the higher 
kidnapping rates and any legislative changes  or procedural reforms.  Moreover, 
Rubio argues that there is no relationship between this boom and the Pastrana 
administration´s concession to the guerrillas of a Swiss-size demilitarized zone, a 
concession that initiated a peace process that by 2002 had failed dismally. This 
second boom began months before the two main guerrilla groups (FARC and ELN) 
introduced a significant change in their kidnapping methods, namely the 
implementation of the so-called “pesca milagrosa,” whereby they carried out 
massive abductions on the roads. As a consequence of this, for a couple of years, 
kidnapping rates soared. . According to Rubio, the share of foreigners (the most 
sought after kind of hostage) among those kidnapped also increased. This new 
kidnapping technique, however, soon backfired. Rubio believes that the only 
reasonable explanation for the emergence of this second boom lies in the 
dynamics of the kidnapping industry itself—that is, the inevitable reduction in 
potential high-income victims eventually forced perpetrators to seek higher 
numbers of hostages. Critical for our understanding of the dynamics of kidnapping 
in Colombia is what came next. According to Rubio, these massive kidnappings 
backfired on the guerrillas, as the country´s reaction against this second wave of 
kidnapping was of such magnitude that the criminal industry soon began to decline.   
Rubio emphasizes that this decline was an endogenous phenomenon, one 
that had nothing to do with policy or legal measures. The author defines this 




decline, the guerrillas were compelled to kidnap less wealthy Colombians.   
Consequently, during this period, the average estimated income of kidnapping 
victims continuously decreased.  This trend is also consistent with the increasing 
share of kidnappings that involve vulnerable groups such as infants and elderly 
people, which Rubio argues became very costly for guerrillas in political terms. 
According to the author, these kidnappings were costly for guerrillas in another 
sense as well; given their nature, they facilitated more successful rescue raids by 
the authorities.   
As can be seen in Figure 1, what is clear is that the decline in kidnappings 
began two years prior to the introduction of President Uribe´s democratic security 
policy. This suggests a complementary hypothesis for explaining the causes of this 
declining trend. In fact, Rubio himself provides some hints at other complementary 
explanations for this dramatic fall in kidnapping rates. When attempting to 
demonstrate that most kidnappings where carried out by guerrillas, and not by 
common criminals, Rubio elaborates about the difficulties involved in rescuing 
victims. According to him:  a) rescuing a hostage is far more difficult in a rural area 
than in urban zones; b) the probability of successfully rescuing a hostage 
decreases exponentially with time; c) successful raids are usually made within 
hours of the kidnapping; and d) after a critical period the proportion of liberated 
victims is significantly reduced.   
This analysis shows that time is a critical variable, both for a successful 
kidnapping and, conversely, for a successful rescue on the part of the authorities. 
The sooner (the later) the police know about a kidnapping, the higher (the less) the 
probability of a successful rescue. It follows then that should the authorities (be it 
the police or the army) find a technology that narrows the time that elapses 
between an abduction and knowledge of it (by the authorities and relatives) the 
greater the likelihood of a successful rescue. Moreover, the technology would itself 




In this context, we argue that the extraordinary expansion in mobile digital 
telecommunication in Colombia has resulted in a significant technological change, 
one that has allowed authorities—in particular, the police—to know about 
abductions much sooner than was the case in the past. The massive expansion of 
handsets has allowed citizens of all types when confronted with an emergency to 
contact the authorities, either directly or via relatives who in turn were able to 
communicate with them. The popular press began to provide incidental evidence of 
this phenomenon a long time ago. For example, on May 29, 1998, the newspaper 
El Tiempo reported that an attempted mass abduction by the FARC in the village of 
Aguas Blancas in the Cesar department was thwarted because one of the potential 
victims had been able to make a speedy phone call to the police. The guerrillas 
had first immobilized and then deviated from the main highway 35 vehicles 
containing approximately one hundred people. As the caravan was advancing 
toward the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, a counter insurgency patrol was able to 
intercept the guerrilla commando, which was forced to flee.  To give another 
example
3, in 2009, the wife of the mayor of Altamira, in the Huila department, was 
able to alert her husband via her cell phone about her impending kidnapping, 
resulting in her being rescued in a timely fashion by the police. More recently,
4 on 
May 10, 2009, the Colombian press reported that in La Uribe, in the Meta 
department, the FARC distributed leaflets prohibiting citizens from using mobile 
phones. The Minister of Defense responded by traveling to the place so as to freely 
present handsets to the people. Speaking to the press, Minister Santos declared: 
“The cellular phone allows people to inform the army of the location of guerrillas.”     
We believe that the new security policy and the expansion of mobile 
communications have complemented one another. High levels of security were a 
prerequisite for investment in telecommunications and this higher investment has 
in turn expanded security. Falling kidnapping rates would not have been possible 
                                                           
3 El Tiempo, January 29/09. 
 





without a police and armed forces trusted by and accessible to the general 
population. Likewise, they would have not occurred without a security apparatus 
with a minimum of disposition to act quickly and efficiently. In countries such as 
Venezuela and Mexico mobile telecommunications also expanded significantly 
during the same period as in Colombia. However, unlike what occurred in 
Colombia, in those countries, kidnapping rates went up dramatically. This suggests 
that an effective security police is a necessary condition in order for rates of 
violence to fall in general and rates of kidnapping to fall in particular. 
In summary, in this paper we attempt to demonstrate our hypothesis that the 
dramatic fall in kidnapping rates in Colombia during the present decade can be 
explained by the interaction between an expanding mobile telecommunication 
network and an effective security policy. In what follows, we test this hypothesis in 
full.   
4.  The market for kidnappings and the technology effect 
In this section we develop a model for the kidnapping market, one which 
describes the interactions between potential victims (society) and criminals 
(kidnappers).  The model is based on two key assumptions. First, both parties are 
assumed to be rational in the sense that they behave in accordance with the rules 
of optimization behavior. Second, we assume an initial group that decides to 
participate in an illegal activity—that is, kidnapping—such that the supply of crime 
they generate (that is, the number of kidnappings) reveals in an implicit way the 
cost function. In this sense, an explanation of the mobility between legal and illegal 
activities exceeds the scope of this paper.  
a.  The supply of kidnappings 
From the criminals’ perspective, the rational behavior condition implies that 




activity’s costs and gains. A straightforward analytical representation of the 
kidnappers’ overall expected net return, t π , is 
() t t t t t S A P g rS ; − = π ,          ( 1 )  
where r is equal to the expected gross payoff per kidnapping
5 and  () ⋅ g  is the 
criminal cost function. The cost function includes two terms (Ehrlich 1996
6): the 
direct costs of planning and executing kidnappings, and the cost of apprehension 
and conviction (Becker 1968). According to Becker and Ehrlich, these costs are 
affected by the private and the public sectors’ actions aimed at achieving protection 
against crime. In particular, kidnapping activity should become more costly as the 
expenditure on policemen and law enforcement, t P , increases.  
We extend this idea by introducing an index of police effectiveness, or what 
we might call the armed forces´ effective protection coverage ( t A ) of society 
against criminal activity—more specifically, from kidnapping. This exogenous 
variable attempts to capture any technological development that may enhance the 
protection of common citizens vis a vis criminals. In our model, these 
developments are consider an externality, in the sense that they are not 
necessarily the result of individuals´ actions demanding higher public or private 
protection. We explain this feature in the next section, where we show the model´s 
demand side. For analytical simplicity, and without any loss of generality, we 
assume a cost function of the following form [or ‘we assume the following cost 
function’]:
7 
                                                           
5 In this case, r is the net payoff discounting failed kidnapping attempts, or kidnappings where 
victim’s family members did not [or ‘choose not to’] negotiate. An alternative way of modeling 
kidnappings is to include the success probability of the crime, as in Mejia 2001. 
 
6 No term for the wage rate of an alternative legitimate activity is included, as in this particular 
model, criminals are dedicated to only illegal activities. 
 
7 The equilibrium for this model of kidnapping, as well as the main results, hold for any type of cost 
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where we include Ω, which represents a geographical variable or any 
variable of an idiosyncratic type such as favors the kidnapping industry. The 
optimal number of kidnappings (
O
t S ) at any given time is set at a level where there 











=   .           ( 3 )  
b.  The tolerated demand for kidnappings 
The level of kidnappings that a society is willing to tolerate can be derived 
implicitly from a people´s demand for consumption and protection.
8 Individuals 
desire protection from crime, but a society´s total expenditure on protection 
diminishes the resources available for the consumption of other goods. In this 
sense, a society implicitly decides the level of kidnapping it is willing to tolerate.
9   
A society is rational in the sense that it maximize the total utility of a particular 
action or good subject to a budget constraint. In particular, a society assigns total 
income  t Y  to the consumption of goods  t C , in order to hire public protection 
(policemen and law enforcers)  t A  and to pay kidnapping ransoms. The budget 
constraint is thus expressed as: 
  t t t t rS P C Y + + ≥ .           ( 4 )  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
























. This implies that  0 ≥ σ . 
8 For simplicity’s sake, we only allow for public protection. 
 





In turn, we assume that  t P  is a function of the level of kidnappings—that is to 
say, if the number of kidnappings increase, people will be willing to pay higher 
taxes for increased and better security. It is straightforward to conclude then that in 
this model, the opportunity cost of crime for individuals is bimodal. A low level of 
expenditure on public protection implies high levels of crime and low levels of 
consumption. Conversely, a greater expenditure on public protection will reduce 
actual consumption.  
For simplicity’s sake, we assume that t t S P λ = , where λ is the magnitude of a 
people´s response to a particular level of kidnappings. Under these circumstances, 
the maximum level of consumption by a society is 
() t t t S r Y C + − = λ ,           ( 5 )  
where λ  is the tax paid to the government (as a function of kidnappings) and 
r, as explained above, is the average ransom fee. 
c. Market  equilibrium 
The aggregate [?] of the conditions related to the behavior of the two relevant 
parties assure a well-defined equilibrium in our kidnapping model. Based on 
criminals’ optimal “supply” of kidnappings (3) and a society´s response function, we 

















St .           ( 6 )  
This in turn leads to a specific aggregate consumption profile, ()
*
t t S C . It is a 
straightforward matter to verify the impact of a society’s efforts at reducing 









* + − − = ; while the 
first term accounts for the direct cost of preventing kidnappings (the steeping of the 














 due to the reduction in kidnappings brought about by a given protection 
policy. In other words, the last term is the partial compensation ( C C − ) resulting 
from the decrease in crime due to increased public security.
10  
Another interesting result derived of the consumption-kidnapping relationship 
is that technological developments that promote more effective security policies—
such as those discussed in section IV.a—lead to lower levels of observed 











λ , as 
shown in Figure 3b. 
Figure 3. The market for kidnappings equilibrium 
a. The net effect on kidnappings and 
consumption by a shock in a society’s 
response to crime ( λ λ > ´ ) 
b. The net effect on kidnappings and 
consumption by a technology shock in a 
public protection policy ( A A > ´ ) 
 
C’<C for  r > λ , and C’’>C for every positive technology shock (e’>e). 
                                                           
10 In particular,  0 <
λ d
dC
 for  r > λ , which can be interpreted as meaning that the marginal 
propensity to pay for public protection is higher that the marginal propensity to pay for ransoms. 




While this analysis is quite straightforward, it is based on the key assumption that 
the cost function of kidnappings for criminals takes the general form introduced in 
section IV.a.  
To summarize, the equilibrium level of kidnappings is a consequence of three 
main factors: first, a society´s perception of crime or, alternatively, a society´s level 
of preference for security; second, geographical and other idiosyncratic variables; 
and third, the level of effectuve coverage of public protection. 
In general, this market-for-kidnapping model is in accordance with the 
classical “deterrence hypothesis,” whereby expenditures on crime control tend to 
offset changes in criminal behavior, such that an upward shock in kidnappings will 
trigger a wave of anti-kidnapping expenditures, which in turn will lower the 
magnitude of the observed shock (Becker hypothesis). Authors like Gaviria (1998) 
and Rubio (2004) have argued that this type of model does not provide an 
appropriate framework for studying the evolution of Colombia’s criminal explosion 
of recent years. However, it should be mentioned that these studies have not taken 
into account the overall crime cycle in Colombia during the last twenty years, in 
particular ,the spectacular reduction in kidnappings that took place during the 
period 2000-2008.   
Consistent with the model developed in this section and with the empirical 
econometric model that we present in the following section, we argue that 
Colombia´s experience in recent years with respect to criminal-markets—in 
particular, the accelerated reduction in kidnapping rates to the low levels of the 
early 80´s—has been a consequence of two different but convergent and 
complimentary forces: (i) changes in people´s perceptions about safety and 
security, which resulted in a dramatic increase in the demand for public protection 
and for higher levels of expenditure for the armed forces—this shift was 
encapsulated by the people´s massive acceptance of President Uribe´s   
democratic security policy; and (ii) technological breakthroughs, among them the 




of the country, inclusive of rural and urban areas. This expansion has acted as a 
low-cost implicit extension of the public protection network against criminals and 
perpetrators of terror.  
5.  The data and a description of the analysis and estimation method 
Our source for official departmental
11 kidnapping data as well as the number 
of police officers for the period 1996-2008 comes from the National Police.
12 The 
Ministry of Communications of Colombia is our main source of information 
regarding the total number of mobile phone lines. The latter data is grouped into 
three regions for the same period (1996-2008). Additional data on “base station 
antennas” is available by region for the period 1996-2003, and by department for 
the period 2004-2008.  
The panel data is organized as follows: (i) a dataset with 13 years (1996-
2008) of observations, and featuring information about kidnappings, the police 
force and mobile phones lines for three regions; (ii) a five year dataset (2004-2008) 
of observations and featuring information about kidnappings, the police force and 
mobile phones antennas for 33 departments. Additional information, like residents 
and GDP series come from the National Administrative Department of Statistics 
(DANE)
13. 
a.  Empirical evidence concerning the Colombian market for kidnappings 
As mentioned in Section II, Colombia saw a rapid growth in kidnapping during 
the second half of the 90’s. Over a three year period (96-99), on average, 
kidnapping rates rose 2.5 times. This was a generalized phenomenon across the 
country, with departaments like Boyacá, Caldas, Casanare, Cundinamarca, 
                                                           
11 Thirty-three (33) departments. 
 








Santander, Tolima and Valle experiencing an increase in kidnapping of over 300 
percent during the period in question. As shown in Figure 4a, this increase was 
followed by a substantial decrease in kidnapping rates, a reduction that largely 
exceeded the initial boom. Again, this downturn trend was common to all regions in 
the country.  A longer-time overview of abduction behavior across regions clearly 
shows that kidnapping rates throughout the country followed a similar pattern 
during the period 1996-2008 (Figure 4b).  
There is no available disaggregated information on dissuasive expenditure or 
on public protection expenditure by department or by region. However, as a proxy 
for such disaggregation, in this paper, we use the regional allocation of the police 
across the country. From this data, it can be inferred that, while there was a small 
increase in the number of police agents during the period 1996-1999, the following 
years saw a generalized public response, one which was private and was highly 
observable. With the categorical introduction of a strong security policy against 
terrorism and crime, the Uribe administration increased the number of police 
officers by 50% between 2002 and 2008 (Figures 5a and 5b.).  
 
Table 4a. Yearly average of 
kidnappings by departament, for the 
periods 1996-99 and 2000-08. 
Table 4b. Time evolution of the 
kidnapping rate by region, between 
1996 and 2008. 
 






Table 5a. Net increase in police officers 
by departaments, for the periods 1996-
99 and 2000-08. 
Table 5b. Time evolution of police 
officers coverage by region, between 
1996 and 2008 
Source: National Police, Dane, authors calculations.
 
b.  Mobile phone communications in Colombia 
In 1993, the Colombian Congress approved Law 37, which regulates the 
supply and provision of mobile telephone services. On January 22, 1994, the 
bidding for this service took place. The country was divided into three areas of 
operation and services: The Eastern Region and Bogotá; Medellín, Cali and the 
Western Region; and the Atlantic Coast.
14 
In order to promote competition, the government established [or ‘reserved’?] 
two bands or segments of the electromagnetic spectrum allocated to this specific 
service. Private companies were awarded the “B” band, while the “A” band was 
awarded to companies representative of a mix of public and private capital. During 
the second half of 1994, the selected companies initiated their operations: 
Celumovil (B) and Comcel (A) in the Eastern Region; Cocelco (B) and Occel (A) in 
the Western Region; and Celumovil (B) and Celcaribe (A) in the Atlantic Coast 
region.  
                                                           
14 The Eastern Region consists of Amazonas, Arauca, Bogotá D.C., Boyacá, Caquetá, Casanare, 
Cundinamarca, Guainía, Guaviare, Huila, Meta, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, San Andrés Islas, 
Tolima, Vaupés and Vichada; the Western Region consists of Antioquia, Caldas, Cauca, Chocó, 
Nariño, Quindío, Risaralda, Santander and Valle; and the Atlantic Coast consists of Atlántico, 




The result was a rapid increase in coverage throughout the country. During 
the first three years, operators installed new antennas at a speed of 35% per year. 
In 2004, the country experienced a second push to promote the development of 
mobile telecommunications, when the Ministry of Communication authorized the 
expansion of the available electromagnetic spectrum for this service.
15 Thanks to 
the telecommunications policies promoted by the government, and thanks to the 
speedy interest and response of the private sector, the country experienced a 
massive increase in mobile phone area coverage and in the number of total lines. 
This trend is summarized in Figure 6, which presents the time evolution of total 
mobile phone lines by region as well as the total number of antennas that were set 
up. 
Figure 6. Mobile phone coverage evolution 
a. Total antennas and annual growth  b. Total lines per number of residents 















2007 7.294 9,83%  
 
Source: Ministry of Communications, Dane, authors calculations.
Finally, Figure 7a provides a cross-section comparison between kidnapping 
rates, the number of police officers, and mobile phone coverage. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the total number of police officers seems negatively correlate with 
kidnapping rates, it is quite clear from Figure 6b that there is a much stronger 
                                                           




correlation between the variables capturing the interaction between technology 
improvements and the police, on the one hand, and between technology 
improvements and kidnappings, on the other. In practical terms, Figure 7b shows 
the long-term relationship between our variables of study—high levels of mobile 
phone coverage, together with high levels of total police officers is consistent with 
low levels of crime, particularly kidnappings. 
Figure 7a. Kidnapping rates versus the number of police officers 
 
Figure 7b. Kidnapping rates versus the number of police officers x the number of 
mobile phones 
 






c.  The estimation method and our results 
In this section, we estimate the determinants of kidnapping in Colombia 
during recent years. Following the theoretical model introduced in Section 3, the 
dynamics of the kidnapping market are governed by the interaction between the 
availability and size of public expenditure on security, and household technology. 
The two combined effectively cover public protection: 
  it it it it it it it GDP A P A P S ε β β β β β + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0   ,     (8) 
where i accounts for each department, and it it A P ⋅  is the effective coverage of 
public protection, defined as the number of police officers per 100.000 residents, 
( it P ), times mobile phone coverage ( it A ). The GDP per capita by region ( it GDP ) is 
included in order to control for economic growth.  
The results in Table 1 are for the available departmental data for the period 
2004-2008. Table 1 shows that there exists a significant negative relationship 
between the interaction term Antennas*Police_officers and the observed “supply” 
for kidnappings. This result is in accordance with the main hypothesis of this 
paper— that greater mobile phone coverage results in a more effective security 
policy, and thus reduces the level of kidnaps. The coefficients for Antennas and 
Police officers should not be interpreted as having marginal effects on the 
kidnapping rates, since these are conditional on the interaction term discussed 
above. In particular, the marginal impact of increasing the number of police officers 
on kidnappings for a specified level of antennas is written as  A
dP
dS
3 1 β β + = . This is 
the solid line in Figure 7. The dashed lines represent the confidence intervals
16 
under which the size of the police force has a significant effect on the observed 
                                                           
16 The significance test on the conditional marginal effect is given by Aiken et al (1991), using the 




kidnapping rates. It can be inferred from Figure 7 that the police (public protection) 
have  a strong negative effect on kidnapping, whenever there exists a minimum 
number of antennas. Moreover, mobile phone antennas make the police more 
effective in their attempt to prevent kidnappings.  
Table 1. The impact of technology on kidnapping. Dependent variable: kidnapping 
per 1.000 residents. 
Regressor  Model 
Antennas  4.039* 
(2.187) 
Police officers  0.6554  
 (.3913) 
Police officers x antennas    -.0531** 
(.0249) 
GDP   279** 
(112) 
Constant   -175 *** 
(37) 
# of observations  132 
 
2 R   0.12 
Note: Standards errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate individual significance at the 10, 5 














Figure 7. The marginal effect of police force variations in kidnappings conditional 
on the extent of mobile phone coverage. 
 
Note: Authors calculations. 
 
Finally, we should note that in the absence of increments in the number of 
police officers ( 0 ≤ ∆P ), there is a positive significant marginal effect for increased 
numbers of antennas on kidnappings. A possible interpretation of this result is the 
following: since in this scenario there is either an non-existent police force or a 
reduction in its size, improvements in mobile phone coverage may be beneficial 
only to criminals, inasmuch as these reduce their costs of operation, regardless of 
the gain in technology by citizens. Hence, the asymmetry in information between 
kidnappers and the police might increase even further. A detailed study of this 
phenomenon could be the focus of future research. Generally speaking then, for a 
minimal size of police force, increased numbers of antennas will have a negative 
impact on the kidnapping industry. 
For completeness, we estimate a modified version
17 of (8) using the regional 
information for the period 1996-2008. In this case, mobile phone coverage is 
                                                           
17  it it it it it it it Y GDP A P A P S ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 , where i stand for region, A is the 
total active mobile phones per resident, and Y is a dummy variable controlling for presidential 




measured as the number of active lines per resident. We control for the 
presidential election years, 1998, 2002 and 2008. The results are presented in 
Table 2. These are consistent with the overall estimation for the departmental data. 
We emphasize again that mobile phone communications could not have reduced 
kidnappings without a well operating security apparatus.
18 
In summary, we found that the expansion of the mobile phone network, 
together with an increase in public protection, has had a significant impact on the 
Colombian kidnapping industry. The dramatic pace at which criminals have 
reduced their supply of kidnappings during the period 2000-2008, and the new 
level of kidnapping rates obtained, were the result of an increase in effective public 
protection coverage, modeled through the substantial gain achieved in mobile 
phone telecommunications. Both the regional information for the period 1996-2008, 
and the departmental data for 2004-2008, support our hypothesis. 
Table 2. The impact of technology on kidnapping. Dependent variable: kidnappings 
per 100.000 residents. 
Regressor  Model 
Active celular phones  -.0882 
(3.2911) 
Police officers  .04860  
 (.0255) 
Police officers x active cellular phones  -.3905** 
(.1947) 
GDP   -3.0880* 
(1.8961) 
Presidential election year  1.5464*** 
  (.4779) 
Constant   -.2994 
(.2890) 
# of observations  36 
 
2 R   0.41 
Note: Standards errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate individual significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent level respectively. The number of police officers per 100.000 residents; the 
                                                           
18 There is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that  0 =
dA
dS
 in the absence of security 




number of active cellular phones per resident.  () = 3 1 cov β β  -.1440.  () = 3 2 cov β β -.0040. 
  
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we attempted to explain why kidnapping rates have fallen so 
dramatically in Colombia during the period 2000-2008. While considering the 
democratic security policy as a necessary condition underlying falling kidnapping 
rates in Colombia, we argue that a complementary condition for this phenomenon 
during the period in question has been the substantial reduction in information 
asymmetries between kidnappers and victims. More specifically, kidnapping rates 
have fallen due to the increasing access of citizens of all backgrounds to mobile 
digital phones. The telecommunication policy in Colombia has been extremely 
successful in modernizing that country´s infrastructure in recent years; it has also 
turned out to be a very powerful security tool against organized crime and 
terrorism.   
The security policy and the expansion of mobile telecommunications have 
reinforced one another. While no significant investment in mobile networks would 
have been possible without an initial improvement in security, the process has 
worked in both directions. Thus, the expansion of the telecommunications network 
throughout the country has had the effect of increasing levels of security.   
In this paper, we capture the democratic security policy in terms of the 
number of members of the police involved during the period studied. It is obvious 
that such a policy went far beyond the evolution of the police. The efficiency and 
morale, not only of the police but also of all the components of the armed forces, 
improved markedly. Moreover, the security policy also included other specific 
measures, such as the payment of ransoms to people who informed the authorities 
about criminal and terrorist activities, and the creation of mobile brigades and 
special new forces like the so-called peasants soldiers. For lack of information 




comprehensive index of security to use in our econometric exercises. Future 
research along these lines might examine in a more sophisticated manner the 
consequences of the democratic security policy. It certainly goes without saying 
that the expansion of mobile telecommunications alone could not have reduced 
kidnappings in Colombia to the extent that has been the case. For instance, it is 
well known that mobile phone coverage has also increased in such countries as 
Venezuela and Mexico, where nonetheless, kidnapping rates have increased.   
The policy implications of this paper are quite straightforward. The 
conclusions reached here reinforce the notion that crime and terrorism prosper 
where there exist huge asymmetries in information between perpetrators on the 
one hand and authorities and citizens on the other. Better technology and better 
intelligence, therefore, becomes critical. The government must also match the 
improved intelligence and technology with correspondent new recruitment, hiring 
and staffing processes and flexible personnel and management policies to attract 
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